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THE INTERSTATE CBTLD AND UNIFORM 
LEGISLATION: A PLEA FOR EXTRA-
LITIGIOUS PROCEEDINGS 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig* 
MORE than a decade ago I posed the problem of the ·"interstate child': somewhat dramatically, but I believe realistically, as 
follows: 
After days of bitter contest, a weary judge dissolves the 
marriage bond and, lacking Solomon's sword, allots the child to 
his mother. Thus the stage is set for the second act of the trag-
edy. Craving a new life for herself and her child, the mother 
moves to another state, and the father, seeing his right of visita-
tion thus put in jeopardy, pleads the mother's removal in the 
original court which, loyal to the more faithful citizen, now 
awards custody to him. Should a judge of the mother's new 
home state heed this change? And again, what should be done 
if the father, disappointed by the original court, uses the first 
visit to acquire possession and himself removes the child to an-
other state? What is any judge to do when faced with vivid de-
scriptions of a child's plight caused by the alleged misdeeds of 
an absent parent or the error of a distant court? Is he to give full 
faith and credit or comity to the foreign court's decree and re-
fuse to re-examine the merits of the first award, or should he fol-
low his ovm discretion in caring for the welfare of the child now 
within his territory?1 
I then proceeded to show that "the courts' answers have been varied, 
as varied as human facts and needs."2 To facilitate prediction, now 
hampered by the dogmatic language in the Conflict of Laws Re-
statement,8 I suggested that courts have, in fact, always felt free 
• Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed. 
1. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345 
(1953), revised in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFUcr OF LAws 822 (Culp ed. 1956). See 
also Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees in California, in 
FAMILY LAW FOR CAUFORNIA LAWYERS 585-94 (Stumpf, Horwitz &: Deal ed. 1956); 
Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 167 
(1953); Ehrenzweig, El reconocimiento de los mandamientos de custodia extranjeros en 
los Estados Unidos, CoNSEJO GENERAL DE. LOS COLECIOS DE A.BOCADOS DE EsPANA (1952); 
Ehrenzweig, Zur Anerkennung kindrechtlicher Verfugungen im intemationalen Pri-
vatrecht der Vereinigten Staaten, 2 EHE UND FAMILIE 84 (1955). 
2. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, supra note I. 
3. REsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 144-47 (1934), provides that a foreign decree 
which creates "the status of custodianship" will be enforced in -the other states if the 
custody -has been awarded by a proper court, i.e., a court of the state of the domicile 
of the child. In such a case the original award, whose merits cannot be re-examined, 
can be altered only for reasons which subsequently arise and which are deemed suf• 
ficient by the forum court. 
[I] 
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either to modify or to disregard a foreign custody decree in 
order to safeguard the child's interest. They have refrained from 
such action and chosen to enforce such decrees only in certain typi-
cal situations in which refusal to do so would benefit a parent with 
"unclean hands," except that a foreign decree will even then be 
disregarded if it has modified a previous award either exclusively 
or at least primarily for the purpose of punishing disobedience.4 
I believe that this suggestion still properly reflects ~urrent prac-
tice. 5 However, this practice by no means gives a fully satisfactory 
solution. There remains the fundamental problem of when, if ever, 
it is justifiable to make the child's welfare depend on his parents' 
conduct. Moreover, there remains the all-important fact that indi-
vidual judges differ in their estimate of human frailties and virtues 
so that even those judges willing to accept, in terms or effect, a 
"dean-hands" test will often reach different conclusions. Thus, the 
losing parent may be encouraged to seek relief outside the state of 
his defeat. 
When I originally offered my re-interpretation of prevailing 
practice, I did not feel that it would be expedient to make sugges-
tions for alternative solutions because I was then convinced that the 
courts were doing the very best they could with the procedural tools 
at their disposal and that there was little hope for an improvement 
of those tools. However, there is such hope now, and the time has 
come to help in the search for new answers. In the following dis-
cussion, I shall comment on two current proposals for uniform and 
federal legislation and shall attempt to formulate a tentative coun-
ter-proposal based primarily on foreign experience. 
l. PROPOSED UNIFORM AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Upon the request of the Committee on Child Custody of the 
Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, Professor 
Leonard Ratner has drafted a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act, which he hopes will alleviate some of the evils now prevailing. 0 
4. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, supra note 1, at 373-74. 
5. See, e.g., State v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 822 (1964), petition discharged, 162 So. 2d 905 (1964); McDonald v. Durchard, 357 
S.W .2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). See also Durk v. Durk, 356 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1962) 
(clean hands); Ex parte Elliott, 114 Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E.2d 804 (1961); Short v. 
Short, 163 Tex. 287, 354 S.W.2d 933 (1962); State v. Kem, 17 Wis. 2d 268, ll6 N.W,2d 
337 (1962) (full faith and credit). See generally EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 86-89 
(1962) (hereinafter cited as TREATISE); EliRENZWEIG 8: LOUJSELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUT• 
SHELL §§ 14, 39 (1964). But see REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 151 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1957). 
6. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem-A. Reply 
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His Draft is based on two major theses, both of which are· designed 
to discourage evasive migration: (1) Initial jurisdiction will be re-
served primarily to the courts of the state in which the child las_t 
resided for at least six consecutive months.7 Any other court which 
acquires jurisdiction on the basis of one of several alternative , 
grounds8 will dismiss the action if it considers itself to be an incon-
venient forum.9 (2) "In proceedings to modify a decree [of a court of 
a sister state having jurisdiction] the court shall give the decree the 
res judicata effect that it would have in the court that made it as to 
the legal and factual issues adjudicated thereby."10 
These proposals, while clarifying the test of jurisdiction, would · 
preserve the assumption borrowed from the Restatement that recog-
nition is due to custody decrees of a sister state which "has juris-
diction." With that assumption I have taken issue in my Treatise 
and several articles;11 I have suggested that according to the pre-
vailing view, as stated by Chief Justice Traynor in Sampsell v. 
Superior Court,,12 several courts concerned ·with a child's welfare 
may have concurrent jurisdiction, and that fun• faith and c;redit is 
never due to awards of custody. Brainerd Currie supports this propo-
. sition in an article directed against Leonard Ratner's Draft, but 
goes beyond my suggestions by proposing congressional clarification 
of the full faith and credit clause "to the effect that no judgment 
shall preclude the courts of a state having a legitimate interest in 
the matter from making whatever custodial decree is required in 
their judgment and discretion, for the welfare_ of the child."18 
Ratner has formulated a persuasive counter-argument: 
[This] multiple jurisdiction-no full faith and credit solution 
reflects the inadequacies of its conventional components: unilat-
eral removal of the child is encouraged and the custody decision 
may be made by a forum that is unfairly inconvenient to the 
to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 183, 196-205 
(1965) (hereinafter referred to as tbe Draft). See also Ratner, Child-Custody in a Fed-
eral System, 62 Mica. L. REv. 795 (1964). For an excellent discussion of tbe general 
problem, see Foster 8: Freed, Child Custody (pts. 1 8: 2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 422, 615 
(1964). 
7. Draft, supra note 6, §§ 2(20), 4(1). 
8. Id. § 4(1)·(3). 
9. Id. § 7. 
10. Id. § 8. 
11. See notes 1 8: 5 supra. 
12. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P .2d 739 (1948). See also Hentz v. Hentz, 371 Mich. 335, 123 
N.W.2d 757 (1963). But cf. Tompkins v. Garlock, 189 Kan. 425, 370 P.2d 131 (1962). 
13. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to judgments-A Role for Congress, in · 
SUl'REME CoURT REvmw 89, 115-16 (Kurland ed. 1964). 
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stay-at-home parent and far from most of the relevant evidence. 
In addition, litigation may proliferate.14 
I disagree with Currie's proposal on the further ground that it con-
cedes potential applicability of full faith and credit to custody 
awards and may therefore mislead courts in the highly probable 
case of congressional inaction. Thus, the issue appears to be joined, 
and happily so, for in addition to Ratner's and Currie's drafts there 
are now circulating a number of competing proposals which may 
ultimately induce the Uniform Law Commissioners to take action 
in this vital field.15 
In partial opposition to all of these proposals, I should like to 
submit that any legislation, in order truly to help the interstate 
child, must be based on something other than traditional pro-
cedures. To be sure, such procedures are in general the least likely 
subject for fundamental reform. It is no coincidence that civil pro-
cedure in this country, whose substantive law in most fields can 
compete in progressive drive and achievement with that of any other 
country in the world, is still lagging behind last century's great 
reforms in the civil-law world. Nevertheless, in the area of child 
custody, if anywhere, we may hope that the profession will be will-
ing, and indeed eager, to avail itself of foreign experience in order 
to mitigate some of the hardships which the law has added to the 
unavoidable human plight of the interstate child. Here, it is sub-
mitted, a re-examination of the traditional adversary approach, with 
its concomitant, features of jurisdiction and full faith and credit, 
must be the starting point. 
O II. THE NEED FOR NEW Toor..s: EXTRALITIGIOUS (NON-ADVERSARY) 
PROCEEDINGS 
The inadequacy of adversary proceedings in matters involving 
children and other "wards of the court" has been increasingly 
recognized. Thus, adoption is now largely carried on under the ex 
officio supervision of courts and official or semi-official govern-
mental agencies, and lunacy proceedings show signs of a growing 
emphasis on the state's concern.16 Most impor'tant, the fast-growing 
14. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem, supra 
note 6, at 193. 
15. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl's memorandum of September 21, 1965, on a proposed 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act for the Legislative Research Center of the 
University of Michigan Law School. This memorandum also mentions a draft prepared 
by Professor Henry H. Foster, which does not yet seem to have been made generally 
accessible. 
16. See TREATISE § 26, at 85-88; § 51, at 188-90. 
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movement for the establishment of family courts17 would concen-
trate jurisdiction over all intrafamilial legal problems in one court 
assisted by experts trained in social work, psychology, and psychia-
try, as well as by "law guardians" representing the children.18 One of 
the earliest and most distinguished supporters of this movement 
has properly suggested: "Why can we not ask what is best for this 
family, diagnose the case, find out what caused the rift, and then 
apply all the skills of all the professions we can bring to bear on 
the problem?"19 
This suggestion has been followed to some extent in the Uni-
form Reciprocal Support of Dependents Act, which has introduced, 
over initial resistance, a novel procedure securing a limited co-
operation ben\Teen courts of different states for the purpose of safe-
guarding the interests of deserted wives and children.20 In contrast 
to the courts following this procedure, which is still hampered by 
some of the by-products of adversary "jurisdiction,"21 tp.e new 
family courts offer much greater prospects for impartiality and 
efficiency in the protection of the interstate child. Substitution of 
extralitigious proceedings in such courts for the adversary process, 
which tends to "fan the flames" 22 of discord instead of soothing 
them, opens the way for-the solution of the interstate problem so 
predominant in child custody cases.23 Tp.e following flight into 
what we may hope is not Utopia envisions family courts in each 
state, with a nationwide jurisdiction conferred by a new Uniform 
Law. 
17. See generally Alexander, The Family Court-An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. Pm. L. 
R.Ev. 602 (1958); Dembitz, New York Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1963); Gold-
berg & Sheridan, Family Courts-An Urgent Need, 8 J. Pus. L. 337 (1959); Kay, The 
.family Court, in CALIF. AssEMBLY JUD. INTERIM COMMITI'EE HEARINGS ON DOMESTIC 
'RELATIONS, app. C, Aug. 13, 14, 1964; Ralls, The King County Family Court, 28 
WASH. L. R.Ev. 22 (1953); Symposium-New York Family Court Act, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 
409 (1963). 
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, chs. 687, 700, 702, 703. See also note 26 infra. 
19. Alexander, The Therapeutic Approach, Univ. Chicago Law School Conference 
on Divorce, Conf. Series No. 9 (1952) 51-54. See also Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963). 
For a retrogressive trend concerning the treatment of juvenile delinquents, see, e.g., 
Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 7; cf. Dem-
bitz, supra note 17, at 518. See also note 43 infra. 
20. See TREATISE 188-90. 
21. See note 40 infra. , 
22. Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences-The Family Court, 21 Mo. 
L. REv. 105, 107 (1956). 
23. Professor Ratner has kindly drawn my attention to the fact that the following 
provisions of his Draft would approach extralitigious proceedings in the sense here 
suggested: § 3(5) permits any interested party to participate and allows the court to 
bring in additional parties on its own motion; § 12 provides for cooperation between 
states in making investigations; and § 8 permits a court to familiarize itself with 
earlier evidence. But see text accompanying note 39 infra. 
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In the field of child custody, I submit that something like the 
following pattern should be the ultimate aim of legislative reform. 
In the most frequently arising situation-that of the child from a 
dissolved marriage-the court pronouncing the divorce, annulment, 
or separation will, except in "migratory" cases,24 be the court of the 
child's "permanent abode"25 and will immediately assume jurisdic-
tion over any child of the dissolved marriage. Subsequently, 
whenever a petition is filed or information rendered by parents, 
other relatives, strangers, or government agencies, that court will, 
as the court of guardianship, take any action it considers appropriate 
and will also assemble a dossier registering all such actions and all 
pertinent information. The court will not rely on either parent for 
the needed initiative in its effort to safeguard the child's interest, 
but rather, on its own motion, will appoint a curator26 (preferably 
but not necessarily with the parents' consent), who will represent 
the child in all proceedings under the court's supervision. This 
curator need not, and usually should not, be a Ia-wyer but rather a 
friend of the court willing to serve without compensation.27 If com-
petent, gratuitous services are not available or if a lawyer is re-
quired, the expense will be borne either by the parent owing a duty 
of support or by the state or county. Possibly the local district at-
torney could be charged with a function in this area similar to 
his responsibilities in interstate support proceedings.28 
A court which has acquired jurisdiction by virtue of "migra-
tory" divorce, separation, annulment, or custody proceedings and 
thus lacks the proper factual rationale for such jurisdiction (per-
manent abode) will, ex officio or upon motion, seek to ascertain 
the court which, by virtue of the child's permanent abode in its 
24. See text following note 42 infra. 
25. This term is tentatively proposed to avoid technical differences between the 
various domicile concepts which prevail in the several states and which may prove 
bother.;ome with respect to ,the child's derivative domicile. See TREATISE § 136, at 873. 
It is to eliminate the corresponding problem on an international level that the Ham-
burg Draft Convention, infra note 45, art. l, uses the term "ordinarily resident," and 
the Hague Convention, infra note 29, art. l, uses the term "habitual residence." 
26. This civil law institution is known in at least four states. See TREATISE § 14, at 
45; § 26, at 82; § 51, at 190. If a curator had represented the child in Yarborough v. 
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), the problem of protecting the child against her 
mother's independent·.waiver of future ·support rights might never have arisen. See 
also Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961), where an illegitimate child 
was deprived of a fatlier and permanent support through her mother's financial deal. 
Cf. Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of LawS-A National Disgrace, 29 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 498 (1962). See generally TREATISE § 85. See also note 18 supra. 
27. See Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents-A New 
Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964). 
28. See TREATISE § 82, at 270-7L · 
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territory, can most effectively protect the child's welfare, and trans-
fer to that court the child's dossier, as well as jurisdiction for any 
future proceedings. A similar transfer may be requested by a com-
petent court of any state to which the child is removed with a view 
to establishing a permanent abode. The court thus taking perma-
nent jurisdiction will be known as the child's guardianship court. 
Such a system has long been in operation between sovereign 
nations which have fundamentally different legal rules.29 Should 
it not therefore be feasible between the states of this Union with 
· their closely related legal rules and strong incentives for effective 
cooperation? It will appear that neither the Draft's advocacy of in-
creased res judicata recognition of sister states' decrees30 nor the 
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction recognized in the Sampsell 
case81 are irreconcilable with this suggested reform. 
A. Res Judicata 
One conflict in this regard between the Draft, its cnt1cs, and 
the proposed solution disappears once we draw the needed distinc-
tion between the full faith and credit requirement as applied to the 
custody award itself and to the adjudication of individual facts and 
issues. We may safely assume, although this assumption should be 
verified by the draftsmen of new legislation, that there is no state 
in the Union which does not treat custody decrees as modifiable 
upon proof of changed circumstances or which, in other words, does 
not treat every new petition as a new cause of action. Thus, since 
the full faith and credit accorded to the judicial decree of a sister 
. 29. See, e.g., Austrian Jurisdiktionsnorm § 111 (Aug. 1, 1895, RGBI. 111): "If this 
seems indicated in the interest of a ward and particularly if there is expected there-
from the promotion of an effective exercise of the ward's protection, the competent 
guardianship court may on its own motion or upon petition, transfer in whole or in 
part its jurisdiction over the ward's person ..•• " (Author's translation.) Section 185 of 
the Austrian Code on Extralitigious Proceedings (Aug. 9, 1854, RGBl. 208) provides in 
part: "The [guardianship] court may in its discretion, in important or doubtful cases, 
prior to any decision upon petition by the guardian or curator, hear the ward's avail-
able close relatives or the ward himself •••. " (Author's translation.) 
The primary, continuing difficulty as between the countries of the civil-law orbit 
is caused by competing nationality and domicile principles. See TREATISE § 136. Thus, 
this is the principal object to which international agreements have so far been di· 
rected. See The 9th Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Conven-
tion Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the 
Protection of Infants, Report, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 708 (1960). See also Miiller-Freienfels, 
Legal Equality of Husband and Wife and the Child's Welfare in Private International 
Law, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 595-648 (1962); VOSKUIL, 
DE INTERNATIONALE BEVOEGDHEID VAN DE NEDERLANDSE RECBTER (1962); Marin L6pez, 
Los conflictos de leyes en materia de tutela, 13 REv. F.sP. DER. INT. 413 (1960). 
30. Draft, supra note 6, § 8. . 
31. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). 
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state never exceeds the effect that the issuing state would give to it, 
full faith and credit to the custody award as such is never re-
quired. 32 However, the fact of that award-the adjudication of the 
right to custody as of the time the determination was made-is as 
clearly entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause 
as is the adjudication of any fact or issue fully litigated in the pro-
ceedings underlying the award.33 Collateral estoppel precludes re-
litigation of such facts and issues in the same manner as it does in 
tax cases involving two different taxable years,34 and is here en-
dowed with full faith and credit as it is in workmen's compensation 
cases litigated under the statutes of two different states.30 The 
decree of a sister state is denied full faith and credit in so far as 
it purports directly to affect title to forum land. The custody 
decree of a sister state is similarly denied full faith and credit in so 
far as it purports to affect a child's custody. However, such a decree 
is, by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, "entitled in [the 
forum] court to the force and effect of record evidence of the equi-
ties therein determined, unless it be impeached by fraud."36 1£ the 
Draft provision concerning res judicata37 is thus understood, it is 
hardly open to objection. 
This result will offer relief to a parent if an attempt is made by 
the other to relitigate such incidental issues as paternity, validity 
of a marriage, ownership of certain property, or the status of certain 
employment. Nevertheless, this result will, and of course should, 
leave great leeway concerning those issues as to which a "change of 
circumstances" is asserted. Since the adjudication of such changes 
is often a matter of individual value judgments, the temptation to 
seek a change of venue remains great, particularly under the Samp-
sell-Currie thesis of concurrent: jurisdiction.88 Does the Draft do 
enough to counter the temptation? I do not think so. 
To be sure, the Draft provides that the second court "may famil-
32. See Bachman v. Meijas, l N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956); TREATISE § 87, at 
290-91; Comment, 49 IowA L. R.Ev. 1178 (1964). Regarding international equivalents, 
see, e.g., Gamillscheg, Herausgabe eines Schweizer Kindes, 23 RAnELS ZErrsCHRIFI' 145, 
148 (1958). See generally KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRlvATRECHT 346-53 (2d ed. 1964): 
Webb, Wardship of Court and the Conflict of Laws, 14 INT. &: COMP. L.Q. 663 (1965). 
33. Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431 (I'ex. 1963); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 369 S.W.2d 
684, 687 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1963) (mother's use of intoxicants). See also Foster &: Freed, 
Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 423, 615, 625 (1964). 
34. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 353 U.S. 591 (1948). 
35. See, e.g., McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961). 
36. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973, 975 (1923), approved 
in Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957) (Traynor, J.). 
37. Draft, supra note 6, § 8. 
38. See notes 12, 13, 31 supra and accompanying text. 
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iarize itself with evidence presented in the prior proceedings by 
reading a transcript of such evidence or a summary agreed to by 
the parties or approved by the judge who heard it. . . ."39 Un-
fortunately, this provision continues to follow the pattern of ad-
versary proceedings, which is so clearly inappropriate in this area. 
As was suggested earlier, any judge intent on doing justice to the 
interstate child must., whenever feasible, avail himself of all the 
evidence bearing on his crucial decision, and no transcript of ad-
versary proceedings, let alone a "summary agreed to by the parties," 
will do for this purpose. The judge has to try to learn all there is 
to know about the entire situation. 
B. Jurisdiction 
Once the courts' independence and interdependence are thus 
established in relation to prior proceedings in a sister state, it be-
comes all the more important to ascertain the forum in which the 
new proceedings can be properly entertained. 
A concept of jurisdiction which has been developed entirely for 
purposes of adversary processes has hampered the recognition of 
what have long been recognized abroad as the exigencies of a sep-
arate category of extralitigious proceedings in which the state, 
through its judicial and administrative agencies, acts, with the par-
ties' assistance, as parens patriae. It is particularly in conflicts cases 
that the adversary concept of jurisdiction is responsible for much 
of the difficulty. Thus, even under the new Uniform Support Act, 
support duties can still be imposed only by the deserter's respond-
ing state, although it is the dependent's initiating state which is 
usually more familiar with the latter's needs and thus more able 
to 'exercise a centralized control over his affairs.40 In the interstate 
law of child custody we are similarly threatened with that obsolete 
scheme of personal jurisdiction which even in adversary proceedings 
is quickly losing both meaning and effect,41 and which in parens 
patriae proceedings lacks both foundation and purpose.42 
39. Draft, supra note 6, § 8. (Emphasis added.) 
40. For a proposal that would, within the newly emerging system of a near-
nationwide jurisdiction, shift the decision to the dependent's state, see TREATISE § 84, 
at 278-79; Bhrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REY. 382, 
396-99' (1954); Lyman, Proposed Amendments of the California Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act, 42 CALIF. L. REY. 400 (1954). 
41. See TREATISE §§ 27-33; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction 
-The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). 
42. We may hope that May v. Anderson, 315 U.S. 428 (1953), which could be inter-
preted as requiring such jurisdiction in custody cases, will remain limited to its facts. 
See TREATISE § 87, at 292. However, abolition of the adversary approach should not, 
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I submit that there is a fundamental need for concentrating 
the responsibility for the interstate child at any one time in one 
court-the "guardianship court" in the parlance of other countries. 
As suggested earlier, this ordinarily exclusive jurisdiction should 
probably be in the state of the child's permanent abode, which, 
except in migratory cases, will usually coincide with the state in 
which the marriage dissolution or separation was obtained. It is 
that court which will have to make ultimate decisions and which 
will, for that purpose, keep the child's dossier containing all infor-
mation obtained by any means, not only in adversary proceedings 
between the parents but also through welfare agencies, court in-
vestigators, or the police.43 Other courts exercising temporary juris-
diction by virtue of the child's transient presence or by virtue of 
nondomiciliary or pseudo-domiciliary divorce proceedings may be 
authorized to take emergency measures,44 but such courts should 
at any time yield to the guardianship court of the child's permanent 
abode, which is in a better position to supervise his welfare. The 
Sampsell rule of an altruistically exercised concurrent jurisdiction 
would thus prevail over both the Draft's complex attempt to adapt 
unadaptable adversary concepts and Currie's anarchic jurisdiction 
of all states with a "legitimate interest." 
Perhaps issue can be joined most easily and effectively if the 
new beginning urged in these pages is formulated as a proposed rival 
Draft Uniform Act. 
III. COUNTER-PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM INTERSTATE CUSTODY ACT'1G 
Article 1. Permanent Jurisdiction: The Guardianship Court 
a. At any one time there shall be only one guardianship court 
for any child whose custody requires judicial action owing to the 
lack of, abuse or neglect by, or conflict benveen natural parents. 
of course, deprive parents of their natural right to participate in the proceedings 
whenever possible. 
43. Ex officio jurisdiction is of course not foreign to the Anglo-American legal sys• 
tem. The entire concept of Chancery process determined by the "King's conscience" 
supports this institution. On the history and relative merits of ex officio and adversary 
proceedings in the supervision of trusts, sec, e.g., Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration 
in England, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 12 (1965). See also note 20 supra, 
44. See, e.g., Dolle, tJber einige Kernprobleme des internationalen Rechts der frei• 
willigen Gerichtsbarkeit, 27 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFl' 201, 220-25 (1962). 
45. This proposal is patterned in part on Professor Ratner's Draft, supra note 6, and 
in part on the Hamburg Draft Convention of the Recognition of Orders on the Cus• 
tody of Infants, 49th Conference of the International Law .Association, 1960. See Docu• 
ment, 9 .AM. J. COMP. L. 519-21 (1960). For another draft, see Kegel, Zur Reform des 
deutschen internationalen Yormundschafts-und Pflegschaftsrechts, in 2 VoM DEtJTSCHEN 
ZUM EtlROPAISCHEN RECHT (FESTSCHRIFT FUR DoLLE) 217, 241-56 (1963). 
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Such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue a permanent 
custody decree and establish and maintain a dossier containing all 
pertinent facts and proceedings. 
b. If no other court has'previously acted as a guardianship court, 
the guardianship court shall be that court in whose territory the 
child has his permanent abode and has been present for at least 
six months. Otherwise, such jurisdiction shall be acquired only, 
through transfer. While the guardianship court shall make every 
effort to secure personal jurisdiction over all· natural and adoptive 
parents, such jurisdiction shall not be required. 
Article 2. Temporary Jurisdiction 
a. Any court in whose territory the child is present shall in 
cases of urgent need have temporary jurisdiction to issue a tempo-
rary custody decree and shall advise the guardianship court of any 
action taken. Such jurisdiction may also be assumed by any court 
in which proceedings for divorce, annulment, or separation are 
commenced. Upon the completion of six months of presence and 
the acquisition of a permanent abode by any child within the ter-
ritory of the court thus exercising temporary jurisdiction, the court 
exercising such jurisdiction shall request the guardianship court 
for a transfer of its jurisdiction and of the child's dossier. The 
guardianship court shall comply with such request if it finds the 
child's presence and change of permanent abode established to its 
satisfaction. 
b. If no court has yet acted as the guardianship court, the court 
of temporary jurisdiction shall assume juri~ction as the guardian-
ship court upon the completion of six months of presence and the 
acquisition of a permanent abode by the child within its territory. 
Article 3. Jurisdiction To Rescind or Modify 
Any court having permanent or temporary jurisdiction may re-
scind or modify a (previous) decree after having secured such rec-
ords, transcripts and other information as may be available in the 
court which has made such decree or elsewhere; provided that a 
prior decree shall have the res judicata effect that it would have in 
the court that made it as to the legal and factual issues adjudicated 
thereby; and provided further that if the child has been removed 
in an attempt to seek a change of custody in disobedience to such 
decree, only the guardianship court shall order such rescission or 
modification. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Draft Uniform Act is of course offered merely as a starting 
point for further discussion and as an illustration of the need for 
and the potential value of examining r foreign legal systems and 
thoughts. 
The American Bar Association has had the courage and the 
foresight to initiate the preparation of a Uniform Act. For many 
years it has also repeatedly and consistently stressed the overriding 
importance and promise of international cooperation. Would it be 
amiss then to suggest that the Association and other draftsmen of 
uniform legislation should, before taking the final steps toward the 
adoption of a Uniform Interstate Custody Act, engage in a thorough 
study of solutions developed elsewhere during the past century for 
problems which are identical with ours in both legal and human 
terms? 
